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COMMENTS
BANKS AND BANKING - A CENTURY-LONG CONFLICT BETWEEN
NATIONAL BANKS AND STATE BANKS OVER BRANCH BANKING.
The scope of this comment is confined to a survey of the development of
federal and state branch banking and the effect thereon of the authority of
the Comptroller of the Currency to establish national branch banks under
the National Bank Act.
It has been in general, unfortunate that the question of what was
the best banking system for a country like ours could not be deter-
mined by itself in a wholly rational manner, and especially unfortunate
that it invariably became entangled in political conflict where passion,
ignorance, and intrigue weigh quite as much as reason, intelligence
and disinterested effort.1
I.
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF BRANCH BANKING.
The history of banking in the United States,2 almost from its incep-
tion, has been marred by a conflict between federal chartered banks and
those organized under the many state banking systems. One of the prime
factors in this struggle has been the development of multiple office banking,3
particularly branch banking.4 Branch banking is not a child of the 20th
1. CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 22 (1942).
2. For a capsule report on American banking, see BANKS, 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 74-76 (1941).
3. Multiple office banking is a phrase commonly used to describe branch banking,
chain banking, and group banking.
Branch Banking is a system of banking wherein a single banking institution
operates offices at locations removed from the main or head office, as distinguished
from independent unit banking. Chain Banking is a type of banking in which the
operations or policies of at least 3 independently incorporated banks are controlled
by one or more individuals-usually built around one key bank. Group Banking is
multiple office banking in which 3 or more independently incorporated banks are
controlled directly or indirectly by a corporation, business trust, association, or
similar organization, popularly known as a "holding company" or "bancorporation."
MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 77-78 (1949). See generally,
CARTINHOUR, BRANCH, GROUP, AND CHAIN BANKING (1931); WILLIT, CHAIN,
GROUP, AND BRANCH BANKING (1930); Legislation Note, Branch, Chain, and Group
Banking, 48 HARV. L. REv. 659 (1935).
4. See 62 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 3 (1924). For further
clarification of the characteristics which distinguish branch banking from chain and
group banking, see generally, CHAPMAN, CONCENTRATION OF BANKING (1934);
OSTROLENK, ECONOMICS OF BRANCH BANKING (1930) ; Fordham, Branch Banks as
Separate Entities, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 975 (1931).
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century. It first appeared in the 18th century in Virginia, where the Bank
of Richmond, chartered in 1792, was authorized to open branches within
that state.5 Pennsylvania soon followed the Virginia example, and the
Bank of Pennsylvania, chartered in 1793, opened several branches. Suc-
cess eluded each of them and by 1810 they had closed their doors. The
early experience of other states in branch banking followed this same
pattern.6 At the national level, the Secretary of the Treasury, as early as
1790, had considered the possibility of establishing national bank branches. 7
The charter of the First Bank of the United States, established in 1791 at
Philadelphia, authorized the establishment of additional offices for the
purposes of discount and deposit only ;8 accordingly, eight "branch" offices
soon opened from Boston to New Orleans. The Second Bank of the United
States had a twenty year charter which directed the establishment of
branches. In response thereto, twenty-five offices were established through-
out the Union. Their existence was brief, because the life of the Second
Bank spanned only two decades. The charter was permitted to expire in
1836 as a result of staunch opposition engineered principally by state bank-
ing interests.9 Having effectively removed the national banks from the
competitive arena, the field was open for a second effort at branching by
the state banks.
5. See generally, DEwEy, STATE BANKING BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1934), and
specifically, Starnes, Sixty Years of Branch Banking in Virginia, 36 J. POL. ECON.
480 (1928).
6. The four branches of the State Bank of Vermont, chartered in 1806, had
ceased to do business by 1812. The charter of the Bank of Kentucky was repealed
in 1822 after a brief 16 years of existence. With it went its 13 branches. See II
ROOT, SOUND CURRENCY No. 10 (1895).
For a history of branch banking in Illinois see II UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE No. 4, THE DEVELOPMENT or BANKING IN ILLINOIS
(1913); INDIANA-X INDIANA UNIVERSITY BULL. No. 2 (1912) ; IOwA-PRESTON,
HISTORY Or BANKING IN IOWA (1922); MISSOURI-CABLE, BANK OF THE STATE OF
MISSOURI (1923) ; NEW YORK-PRoCEEDINGS, N.Y. STATE BANKERS' ASSN., BRANCH
BANKING BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1925).
7. "The situation in the United States naturally inspires a wish that the forms
of the institution could admit of a plurality of branches. But various considera-
tions discourage from pursuing the idea. The complexity of such a plan would
be apt to inspire doubts, which might deter from adventuring in it. And the
practicability of a safe and orderly administration though not to be abandoned
as desperate, cannot be made so manifest in perspective, as to promise the
removal of those doubts, or to justify the government in adapting the idea as an
original experiment." ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK
(1790).
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 579 (1819), sanctioned the right
of Congress to charter a national bank to aid the federal government in the per-
formance of its functions.
9. In Ohio, the legislature attempted to impose a $50,000. tax on each of the
federal branch banks located in that jurisdiction. The Second Bank of the United
States sought an injunction. Acting upon the pretense that the State had not been
notified legally of the injunction, a sheriff seized $90,000. and turned it over to the
state treasurer. This brought about the arrest and imprisonment of the state officers,
and the money was returned to the branches.
For the rule that states may not exercise any control over national banks nor
affect their operations except insofar as Congress may deem proper to permit, see
Farmers and Mechanics National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 196 (1875).
[VOL. 8
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II.
THE NATIONAL BANK ACT OF 1863.
A.
Creation of the Office of Comptroller of the Currency.
In 1833, state bank branches reappeared on the financial scene and
for about thirty years they prospered. The federal government then re-
asserted itself with the creation of the National Banking System in 1863.10
Thus, after three decades, the banking conflict was reincarnated. The Act
of 1863, as amended in 1864,la provided, among other measures, for the
creation of the office of Comptroller of the Currency, to which the general
administration of the act was entrusted. Those who have held this position
through the years have generally maintained a somewhat unfriendly atti-
tude toward state chartered banking institutions and their ever increasing
facilities of multiple office banking."
B.
The Amendment of 1866.
The Act of 186312 contained no specific mention of branch banking.
However, by an amendment in 1864,13 state banks were invited to exchange
their charters for national charters, without surrendering their previously
established branches. Much to the chagrin of the federal banking author-
ities, the state banks did not respond to this enticement, and so another
amendment to the Act of 1863 was proposed. This was intended to be
more persuasive - and it was. Congress, on July 1, 1866, imposed a 10%
10. 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
10a. 13 Stat. 99 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § I (as amended, 1958).
11. Comptroller of the Currency W. L. Threnholm, in 1887, suggested the rescis-
sion of that provision of the National Banking Act of 1865 which permitted state
banks with branches to retain them after such state banks had converted to the na-
tional system. Comptroller Dawes, in 1923, was instrumental in having the Federal
Reserve Board alter its theretofore liberal attitude toward branch banking. Prior to
1920, the Board had repeatedly urged Congress to amend the Federal Reserve Act of
1913 in order to permit national banks to establish branch offices within the corporate
boundaries of the city in which the national bank had its office. 6 FED. RES. BOARD
ANN. REP. 64-65 (1919).
Once having been made cognizant of the fact that it was attempting in vain to
eradicate the branch bank portion of the national vs. state bank conflict by seeking
liberalization of federal laws prohibiting national branching, the Board acted to
balance the interests by denying its state member banks the right to set up additional
branches or offices outside the city or municipality of the parent institution. See
CHAPMAN, CONCENTRATION OF BANKING 132-134 (1934).
In 1928, Comptroller John W. Pole championed the idea that national banks be
permitted to operate branches within "trade areas" surrounding their operative locales
in all states, regardless of state restrictions on branch banking, so as to enhance the
attractiveness of a national bank charter.
The antagonism of the Comptrollers of the Currency did not go unnoticed in
banking circles. The American Bankers' Assn., at its 1935 convention, made quite
clear to those in attendance the viewpoint of the Comptrollers. See CHAPMAN &
WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 125-134 (1942).
12. A challenge to the Act's constitutionality was defeated in Farmers and
Mechanics National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 196 (1875).
13. 13 Stat. 112 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 35 (as amended, 1958).
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tax on all notes of state banks paid out by state and national banks. 1 4 This
congressional message could not have been clearer: convert to the national
system or close your door. State banking systems staggered under the
force of this blow, since note issuance had accounted for a major portion of
their business.
With this deprivation of note issuing power, one of the motivating
factors of the branch movement vanished. Branches were outlets for the
notes of the main office, and they also kept these in circulation, that is,
away from the head office for a period longer than was possible under the
traditional unit bank system. 15 Thus, in 1865, while the North and the
South battled for political supremacy in the Civil War,16 the federal gov-
ernment, with one sweeping attack, had asserted its dominance in the field
of banking. As a result, many state banks relinquished their charters and
entered the national system.' 7 In seven years over thirteen hundred state
banking institutions had vanished from the scene,' 8 but state banking man-
aged to survive. They soon learned that currency issuance, important as
it was to their financial growth, was not vital to their existence. The advent
of increased commercial banking services more than filled the void caused
by the loss of note issuance. Toward the end of the 19th century, branch
banking reappeared in a very mild form to satisfy a growing need for bank
facilities in small communities.
III.
REBIRTH OF STATE BRANCH BANKING.
As the 20th century dawned and branch banking again began to
flourish in the various states, federal banking authorities saw a need for
renewing their struggle to obtain a parity for national banks with state
banks. Branch banking in remote areas was laying bare vast financial
resources which the national banks, under their traditional concept of unit
banking, could not hope to reach. Without the aid of federal legislation
permitting national banks to establish and operate branches, the chore of
obtaining competitive equality loomed greater than before. Rather than
relax restrictions on the national banks, the federal government struggled
to restrain the energies of rejuvenated state banks. The National Bank
Act of 1863,19 it must be remembered, contained no authorization to na-
tional banks to engage in branch operations. The amendments which fol-
lowed in 186520 did not alter this situation. Nor did any of the fifty
14. 13 Stat. 484 (1865). See also text at note 21, infra.
15. Supra, note 2. Unit type banking has been described as that largely "con-
ducted by local institutions, owned by local capital, managed by resident officers, and
having a single office." MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 77 (1949).
16. As to the effect of the War on the demise of state banking, see KNOX, A
HISTORY OF BANKING IN UNITED STATES (1900).
17. CONG. GLOBE 1281, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. (1865).
18. CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 61.
19. Supra, note 10.
20. 13 Stat. 484 (1865).
[VOL. 8
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amendments enacted between 1865 and 1913 effect a fundamental change
in the system. The inability to establish branches was beginning to strangle
the national banks, and federal authorities in Washington sensed it.
IV.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.
The hostility which had characterized the attitudes of some of the
early Comptrollers of the Currency 21 regarding national and state branch
banking began to wane contemporaneously with the resurgence of the
latter's thriving branching operations. The competitive advantage of the
state bank was now quite apparent to national bank authorities.
Comptroller Echels had signalled this mellowing in 1896 when he
recommended that national banks be permitted to establish branch offices
in towns and villages having fewer than 1,000 inhabitants provided that no
national bank was there located.22 Hence, in 1919 there issued forth from
the office of the Comptroller a request to the Congress that legislation be
enacted to enable national banks, situate in states where branch banking
was sanctioned, to operate branches in the locality of the national bank.
This proposal fell upon deaf congressional ears.2 3 Confronted with this
opposition, the Comptroller, by administrative interpretation of the general
laws of the United States, departed from the precedent of his predecessors,
and, in 1922, authorized national banks to establish "additional offices." 24
21. Supra, note 11. Comptroller McCulloch had reported to Congress on No-
vember 28, 1863, that ". . . the idea has at last become quite general among the
people that the whole system of State banking, as far as circulation is regarded, is
unfitted for a commercial country like ours." BANKING STUDIES, BOARD OF Gov.
FED. REs. 45 (1941). Inasmuch as the hundreds of various state bank notes pre-
vented any expectation of currency stability or safety, the Comptroller's observation
was not without foundation.
22. 34 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENcY ANN. REP. (1896). Two years later,
Comptroller Dawes devised a limited scheme of branch banking for communities with
fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. He refused, however, to espouse any notions of a
national system of branch banking. His successor, Comptroller Ridgely, shared the
views of his predecessor that the time had come to reconsider the national banks'
need for branches. See 40 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENcY ANN. Rep. (1902).
23. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 49 Stat. 704 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 521(1958), offered membership in the Federal Reserve System to state banks regardless
of their branch operations, while national banks, required under the act to be members,
had no similar right to establish branches. Up to this time, i.e. circa 1925, the
greatest branching power that Congress would allow to national banks came with the
Consolidation Act of 1918, 49 Stat. 719 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 34(a) (1958), which
permitted national banks to operate branches obtained through consolidations with
banks already operating branches.
24. Condemnation of this practice of the Comptroller soon came from the
Supreme Court in First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 44 S. Ct. 213
(1924). In striking down this narrow extension of the Comptroller's authority, the
Court rejected the argument of the national bank, appearing amicus curiae, that the
establishment of branches was the exercise of an incidental power under Rev. Stat.
5136, 12 U.S.C. 249 (1933):
The mere multiplication of places where the powers of a bank may be exer-
cised is not, in our opinion, a necessary incident of a banking business, within
the meaning of this provision. Moreover, the reasons adduced against the exist-
ence of the power substantively are conclusive against its existence incidentally;
for it is wholly illogical to say that a power which by fair construction of the 5
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The Comptroller did not consider this to be branch banking because he
withheld from these offices the authority to make loans without approval
of the head office. These limited-power branches were, to his thinking,
merely an "extension of the activities of the head office."'25 So it can be
seen that a half century after the passage of the National Bank Act of
1863, the complexion of national branch banking was still grim.
With the Comptroller of the Currency seemingly beginning to relax
his once rigid attitude of disfavor for branching, and with the Federal
Reserve Board altering its once liberal attitude toward state branches, 26
the issue became refined. Would Congress retreat from its adamant stand
on branch banking, or would the states restrict the multiple office expansion
of their banks? The latter would have been too much to expect. 27
V.
McFADDEN ACT OF 1927 AND THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF 1933.
Eventually the Comptroller's efforts to achieve some semblance of
competitive equality between the country's two banking systems bore fruit.
In an eleventh hour attempt to harness the wholesale conversion of national
banks to the state systems, Congress acted, and the McFadden Act of 1927
was passed.28 For the first time since the establishment of the national
system, 29 its banks were free to set up branches in any state permitting
statutes is found to be denied, nevertheless exists as an incidental power. Cer-
tainly, an incidental power can avail neither to create powers which, expressly
or by reasonable implication, are withheld nor to enlarge powers given: but
only to carry into effect those which are granted. 263 U.S. at 659, 44 S. Ct.
at 216..
25. Supra, note 11.
26. 40 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENcY ANN. REP. (1902).
27. The arguments relating to branch banking circa. 1925 could well be
summarized in this fashion:
Against: 1. The National Bank Act of 18M3q denied national banks the right
to establish and operate branches.
2. If branch banking is not curtailed, it will eventually cause
monopolies in the field of banking.
3. Interests of the community will not be given prime attention
under the absentee ownership characteristic of branch banks.
4. Branch banking is un-American because the American ideal is
self-government.
5. The banker under the traditional unit system has the interest of
the community at heart, but his counterpart, the branch manager
will not.
For: 1. Under the unit system small communities suffer without the
requisite banking facilities.
2. A system of branch 'banks does not require the great capital
outlay involved in a large number of independent unit banks.
3. In the face of competition which they cannot meet, national
banks will convert to state systems.
4. Demands of branches for currency result in leakage away from
the large financial centers to smaller communities where cur-
rency is needed.
5. Branch banking tends to stabilize a uniform interest rate on a
national basis.
28. 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1958).
29. Supra, note 10.
[VOL. 8
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state banks to do the same; however, branch banking was restricted to
the corporate limits of the communities in which the national banks were
located.3 0 The proponents of national bank branching were appeased, but
only temporarily. With perseverance they pressed for even greater free-
dom. They wanted national banks to have the authority to establish
branches independently of state regulations for state branches. Reacting
to these pressures, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.31
Under its authority national banks were empowered, with the approval of
the Comptroller of the Currency, to establish branches on a statewide
basis where the statute law of the state would permit this privilege to
state banks, ". . . by language specifically granting such authority affirma-
tively and not merely by implication or recognition."
This further relaxed restrictions on branching by national banks,
insofar as the McFadden Act of 192732 had authorized local branching
only; Congress, however, still would not accede to the proposition that
national banks be given unlimited power to set up branches independently
of state restrictions. 33 Obviously, Congress was responding to the pleas
which so often sought competitive equality between national and state
banks. Generally, the Act of 1933 was hailed as a long overdue congres-
sional achievement in that it put national banks in competitive equilibrium
with state banks while preserving the principle of state autonomy.
3 4
Greater liberality than this Congress refused to grant to national banks and
to date, Congress has not retreated from its position despite pressure from
various circles to do so.35
30. The act also granted indeterminate charters to national banks and Federal
Reserve Banks; it broadened the national banks' power to make real estate loans;
it increased the maximum amount that could be loaned to an individual borrower,
and it streamlined the procedure for consolidations of state and national banks under
the latter's charter.
31. 48 Stat. 189, 190 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1958).
32. Supra, note 28.
33. As a result of this Act of 1933, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which had
placed restrictions on its federal member banks' branching (note 23, supra.) was now
amended to permit its members to branch pursuant to the Banking Act of 1933.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1958) provides:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of
the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of
the city, town, or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment
and operation are at the time expressly authorized to state banks by the law of
the State in question; and (2) at any point within the state in which said
association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the same time
authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language
specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication
or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the
law of the State on State banks ...
See Legislation Note, Branch, Chain and Group Banking, 48 HARV. L. REv. 659
(1935).
35. The American Bankers' Association, at its 1935 convention, voiced its
endorsement of the act and noted that such action was in the best interests of the
nation - state banks as well as national banks:
The Federal Congress and the Comptrollers of the Currency have, for the most
part, beeti antagonistic to the expansion of branch banking. After four years
of bitter wrangling, the Congress passed the McFadden-Pepper Act of 1927,
with its weak compromises on the branch bank question, and even the failure
of over half the banks of the United States ,vas not sufficient to convince the
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VI.
AUTHORITY OF COMPTROLLER UNDER THE ACT OF 1933.
The National Bank Act of 193336 was, in a sense, a victory for the
Comptroller of the Currency insofar as he was given the authority to per-
mit national banks to establish statewide branches. He was not a total
victor, however, because Congress placed a restriction on his discretionary
authority, namely, he could permit national banks to branch only under
the conditions prescribed by the statute law of those states which permitted
state banks to branch.37 Hence, if a state statute prescribed branch banking,
the Comptroller's authority under the act was valueless.38 Although not
completely satisfied,3 9 the Comptroller now had at his disposal much greater
means to alleviate the burden of "competitive inequality" between national
and state banks than had any of his predecessors.40
The authority of the Comptroller under § 36(c) has not been the
subject of an abundance of litigation; as a result, such cases as do exist
1933 Congress of the wisdom of allowing branch banks to develop and thus to
provide the country with a sounder banking structure ...
CHAPMAN AND WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 22 (1942).
As recently as September, 1962, an advisory committee to the Comptroller issued
a report which contained recommendations for branching power broader than that
given to national banks by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The committee couched
its recommendations in the name of "improved operating efficiency." It also offered
the claim that limitations on the branching powers of national banks have put them
at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other financial institutions - not state
banks, but Federal Savings & Loan Associations which are permitted to branch
without regard to state law.
The "trading area" idea of 1928 (note 11, supra.) was revitalized, but the coin-
mittee was aware of the difficulties in defining this amorphous concept.
The committee made these recommendations:
The committee believes that the expanding needs of our economy for banking
facilities and services requires a re-examination of both Federal and State laws
with respect to the branching privileges of banks.
While the Committee is well aware that there is a lack of unanimity on this
question [whether the public interest will be best served by Congressional
authorization for the establishment of branches by national banks under federal
standards, irrespective of the law of the state where the bank is located] the
Committee, with three members dissenting, believes that such action by the
Congress is in the public interest, and recommends that the law be amended
so that any National Bank, in addition to its present right to branch in accordance
with State law, may be permitted, 2 years after the amendatory bill is effective,
to establish branches within a limited area within the State in which the
principal office of the particular National Bank is located.
. . . At least initially, branching within a fixed radius of 25 miles from the
principal office seems appropriate. Three members of the Committee believe that
the law on this subject should not be amended and that the rights of National
Banks to establish branches should continue to be subject to State Control.
NATIONAL BANKS AND THE FUTURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
BANKING TO THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 51 (1962).
36. 48 Stat. 189 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1958).
37. Supra, note 34.
38. The Comptroller of the Currency may never approve an application for a
national bank branch in a state when a statute would prohibit state branch banking.
Commercial State Bank of Roseville v. Gidney, infra, note 57.
39. Supra, note 38.
40. Supra, note 26. See also 60 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP.
(1922).
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are significant. In Michigan National Bank v. Gidney,4I a national bank
commenced an action against the Comptroller to compel him to authorize the
establishment of a branch bank in a city other than that in which plaintiff's
main office was located. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals42 affirmed the adverse summary judgment suffered by the Michigan
National Bank in the District Court for the District of Columbia, 43 hold-
ing, that since the Michigan statute44 forbade the establishment of the
branch under such circumstances, § 36(c) prevented the Comptroller
from approving an application to set up a branch in any but the city of
the national bank's main office.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in National
Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank,45 held that the Comptroller's
approval of a national bank branch application was not effective until the
Comptroller had issued his formal certificate. 46 The court emphatically
announced that § 36(c) prohibited the Comptroller from authorizing a
new branch for the National Bank of Detroit in the city of Troy, after the
Wayne Oakland Bank, a state chartered institution, had commenced a
branch operation in that city. The court reached this result because, in its
opinion, a Michigan statute containing a limitation on branch banking
was controlling. 47 The court summed up its position in this fashion:
We are of the opinion that, contrary to the contentions of the
appellant, the Michigan statute (17 M.S.A. Section 23.762) is here
controlling; that the limitation therein contained as to branch banks
applies, not only to state banks, but to national banks as well; and
that Title 12 U.S.C.A. Section 36, not only did not empower the
Comptroller to establish a branch of the National Bank of Detroit in
Troy, Michigan, subsequent to the establishment in that city of a
branch of the Wayne Oakland Bank, but, by clear implication, pro-
hibited him from doing so. 48 [Emphasis added].
In reply to the contention of the National Bank of Detroit that Congress,
via § 36(c), intended to permit a national bank to establish a branch at
41. 237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 847, 77 S. Ct. 55 (1956).
42. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (5), state banks, almost without exception,
will be forced to sue the Comptroller in the District of Columbia. A national bank
may sue in the district where it is located. 28 U.S.C. § 1394 (1958).
43. Ibid.
44. Micr. Comp. LAws § 487.34 (1948) provides that "... any bank may
establish and operate a branch or branches within the limits of the city . . .
in which said bank is located."
45. 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830, 79 S. Ct. 50 (1958).
In Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank of Westfield, 31 U.S.L. Week 2307 (D.N.J.
Dec. 10, 1962), the court construed the New Jersey statutory language [17 N.J.S.A.
92-19 (1948)] : ". . . in which no banking institution has its principal office or branch
office" to mean "in which no banking institution has been authorized to establish
and maintain a branch office." Thus, once a state bank had been granted authority
to set up its branch, the national bank could not establish a branch, despite the fact
that the branch of the state bank had not yet been built.
46. 12 C.F.R. 4.5(a)(3).
47. 17 M.S.A. § 23.762 contains a provision that "... no such branch shall
be established in a city or village in which a state or national bank or branch
thereof is then in operation ......
48. 252 F.2d 537, 539-40 (6th Cir. 1958).
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any location where state statutory law permitted the establishment of a
state branch bank, the court retorted that the congressional motivation
behind § 36(c) was to give a national bank only the same rights that it
could have enjoyed if it were a state bank. In other words, if a state bank
would not be allowed to establish a branch because of an already existing
branch in the vicinity, a national bank was to enjoy no greater right.49
After stating the pertinent part of § 36, the court continued:
* . .In our view, the meaning of the foregoing statutory provision is
that a national bank shall be permitted to establish an outside branch
in a city if state law permits a state bank to establish and operate an
outside bank, at the time, in the same city. If there were no other
bank operating in Troy, the establishment of a state or national bank
would, at that time, be permitted. In this case, however, there was
already a branch of a state bank permitted by state law and established
in the city of Troy. . . . [T]he conclusion follows that . . . the
National Bank of Detroit could not, even with the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency, establish a branch in Troy, since the
establishment of such a branch would not have been authorized, at
the time, to state banks by the laws of Michigan by language spe-
cifically granting such authorizations affirmatively. . ..0
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was not at all persuaded by Comp-
troller Gidney's argument that his informal notice of approval was an
irrevocable commitment to the national bank and hence should be given
the same effect as a formal certificate. 51 Instead, the court in this per
curiam decision, held that there could be no "establishment" of a national
bank branch within the statutory meaning of the term unless and until
the Comptroller issued his certificate. 5 2 "A nod, a conversation, a telephonic
communication, a telegram, or letter .. .,,15 would not suffice.
Unless there is a state statute precluding the establishment of a national
bank branch, opined the court in Community National Bank of Pontiac v.
Gidney, 4 it is solely within the discretion of the Comptroller to approve
or reject an application for such branch. Although the court found that
the action of the Comptroller was not arbitrary, there is language in the
opinion that the Comptroller's action is not subject to judicial review even
49. "The history of federal legislation regarding branch banking and the statutes
applying thereto leave a clear and definite impression that Congress intended, with
respect to the location of branches, that a national bank should have no greater
rights than it would have if it were a state bank, and that a national bank was to be
permitted to establish and operate a branch in a state only at such a point as it
could, by express provisions of a state statute, establish and operate a branch, if it
were then a state bank." Id. at 540.
50. Id. at 543.
51. Id. at 540-541.
52. 12 C.F.R. § 4.5(a) (3) provides: "If the decision is unfavorable, the appli-
cant bank is notified, If the decision is favorable, the Comptroller issues a formal
certificate evidencing his approval and consent to the establishment and operation of
a branch bank at the designated location."
53. 252 F.2d at 543.
54. 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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though it be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.5 5 On appeal to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision of the district court was modified
to hold that the Comptroller's decision was not reviewable unless it was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law."5 6 This result is in accord with a 1959 decision from the Dis-
trict of Columbia that it is never within the Comptroller's discretion to
issue a certificate unlawfully.57 Since Congress has chosen to adopt state
law on the establishment of branches by state banks as the measuring stick
for the establishment of branches by national banks,58 the Comptroller may
not, in his discretion, authorize a branch bank in a situation where state
statutory law would not permit a state bank to operate a branch.59
VII.
THE CAMDEN TRUST DEcISION.
Perhaps the most important question of statutory construction to arise
under the National Bank Act since the Supreme Court decided First
National Bank v. Missouri,60 and the most serious test of the Comptroller's
"new" authority under § 36(c), arose in Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney.6'
Simply stated, the facts in that case were these. Camden Trust Company,
a state bank, operated a branch in Delaware Township, New Jersey. Had-
donfield National Bank had branches in adjacent townships, but none in
Delaware Township. In 1960, Haddonfield National, realizing that it
could not establish a branch in Delaware Township because of the appli-
cable statutes,62 requested permission of the Comptroller to move its main
office to Delaware Township, while retaining its present office as a branch.
As anticipated, Haddonfield National's request was denied. It was then
decided that the individual directors of Haddonfield National would apply
to the Comptroller for the incorporation of a "new" national bank in
Delaware Township. The Comptroller gave preliminary approval, and
Camden Trust Company filed suit for declaratory and .injunctive relief con-
55. Id. at 517.
56. Community National Bank of Pontiac v. Saxon, 31 U.S.L. Week 2276 (6th
Cir. Nov. 26. 1962). There is a "presumption of reviewability" where one's vital
interests are affected adversely by administrative action. 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 31 (2d ed. 1958).
57. Commercial State Bank of Roseville v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C.
1959), aff'd per curiam, petition for rehearing denied, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
58. Supra, note 36.
59. 174 F. Supp. 770, 778 (D.D.C. 1959).
60. 263 U.S. 640, 44 S. Ct. 213 (1924).
61. 301 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886, 82 S. Ct. 1158
(1962).
62. Supra, note 34, and 17 N.J.S.A. 9a-19 (1948)
B. No bank or savings bank shall establish or maintain a branch office
which is located outside the municipality in which it maintains its principal office;
except that a bank or savings bank may establish and maintain a branch office or
offices anywhere in the same county as that in which it maintains its principal
office.
(3) When each proposed bank will be established in a municipality in which
no banking institution has its principal office or a branch office.
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tending that in substance Haddonfield National was acquiring a branch
facility in Delaware Township in violation of § 36(c)(2).3a The district
court sustained the Comptroller's motion for summary judgment, and the
court of appeals, judge Bastian dissenting, affirmed the district court's
rulings that as a matter of law the Comptroller had absolute discretion to
approve the establishment of a "new" national bank under 12 U.S.C.
§§ 21-27,64 and that § 36(c) (2) was inapplicable. The court stated further
that the fact that the "new" bank was an affiliate of Haddonfield National
did not detract from its separate corporate existence. Camden Trust's
petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied.oa
Interestingly enough, in Camden Trust it would seem that the Comp-
troller failed to recognize that the affiliate bank was only a branch in
disguise. Section 36(c) (2) was completely disregarded. As has been
illustrated, 6  the Comptroller would have had to determine, under
§ 36(c) (2), the disposition of such an application for an "affiliate" bank
under the statutory laws of New Jersey. Because New Jersey would have
rejected the application for a state bank, the Comptroller would have been
powerless to authorize the establishment of the "new" bank.67
Vill.
CONCLUSION.
As a result of Camden Trust, the scales of "competitive equality,"
which Comptrollers of the Currency had for so long and so vigorously
63. The National Association of Supervisors of State Banks and the State of
New Jersey appeared amici curiae and urged that the Comptroller be enjoined from
authorizing such evasion of federal and state banking laws through the guise of a
"new" bank.
64. These sections of the National Bank Act deal solely with authorization of
new banks, while § 36(c) relates only to branch banks.
65. 369 U.S. 886, 82 S. Ct. 1158 (1962). Because this question probably will never
be litigated again in the federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court may never decide
the question. See U.S. S. Ct. Rules 19: Considerations Governing Review On
Certiorari.
1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and impor-
tant reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measur-
ing the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered
(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another court of appeals on the same matter or has decided an
important state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable state or
territorial law; or has decided an important question of federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court; or has decided a federal question in a
way in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court; or has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power
of supervision....
66. Supra, notes 34, 41, 48 and 49.
67. As is customary in this type of situation, the Comptroller and the state bank-
ing authorities in New Jersey corresponded on the project, and the Banking Com-
missioner expressed his opposition to the proposed bank. 301 F.2d 521, 523 (D.C. Cir.
1962). Interestingly enough in Wayne Oakland Bank, note 45, supra, the Comptroller
kept the national bank application confidential - a departure from a prior working
agreement which existed between the Comptroller and the Michigan Commissioners.
[VOL. 8
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labored to balance, are definitely now in a state of imbalance in favor of the
national banks. Instead of a situation in which state and national banks
establish branches on equal footing, national banks now have at their
disposal a device for establishing branches under conditions where state
law would prohibit state banks to branch. It is indeed unfortunate that
the cooperation which is essential for the most efficient conduct of this
country's banking system is wanting between the two powers which control
banking, namely, the national and state governments.68 So, the conflict con-
tinues. Perhaps the states may retaliate, or perhaps state autonomy in
banking has breathed its last.
With the Camden Trust decision, the Comptroller has achieved through
the courts that which Congress never granted to him or his predecessors,
that is, absolute power to authorize branch banks without regard to state
regulations for branch banking. What remains of § 36(c) (2) is only a
matter of conjecture. The competitive equality which it sought to establish
and preserve has been dealt a blow from which it may never fully recover.
William F. Coyle
68. In National Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537, 543 (6th
Cir. 1958), it was said:
All of the foregoing would seem to demonstrate the wisdom of cooperation
between the state and federal banking authorities in matters affecting the approval,
and the establishment of state and national banks. Such cooperation seems to
have been intended by Congress, and, in this case by the Michigan legislature.
The express provisions of the federal statute governing the establishment and
operation of national banks look to what has been done by the state; and the
express provisions of the state statute look to what has been done by the federal
government. This accounts for the working agreement between the Comptroller
and the Michigan State Banking Commission to the effect that the Comp-
troller would always notify the State Banking Commissioner of any appli-
cation by a national bank for the opening of a branch in the State of Michigan
in order to avoid the Comptroller's approval of a branch of a national bank in
a city in Michigan in which a state bank or its branch was already established,
or had been approved by the Michigan State Banking Commission.
It was the deviation by the national banking authorities from this established
practice, at the request of the officers and legal counsel of the National Bank
of Detroit that the Comptroller keep that bank's application for a branch con-
fidential and secret from the Michigan State Banking Commissioner, which
resulted in the conflict in this case between the state and national banking
authorities.
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States permitting
Statewide branch bankingf
Alaska
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Hawaii
Idaho
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Nevada
North Carolina
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Washington
States permitting branch
banking within limited areas
Alabama
Arkansas
Georgia
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Tennessee
Virginia
Wisconsin
APPENDIX A
Number of
State Branches
2
56
427
117
53
55
19
87
87
137
16
403
38
40
131
31
18
32
APPENDIX B
Number of
State Branches
14
32
48
149
180
12
76
180
377
116
25
3
193
27
946
28
347
7
356
34
91
152
139
Number of
National Branches
27
136
1,313
111
*63
30
68
97
49
114
23
142
167
49
28
42
19
266
Number of
National Branches
76
22
69
187
10
17
87
226
237
28
10
13
273
33
527
1
346
20
509
28
139
148
20
t 99 COMPTROLLER Or THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. (1961). Statistics as of
December 31, 1961.
* This includes 31 branches of 6 nonnational banks under the supervision of the
Comptroller of the Currency.
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States prohibiting branch
banking, or with no laws
regarding branch banking
Colorado
Florida
Illinois
Minnesota
Montana
New Hampshire**
Texas
West Virginia
Wyoming**
COMMENTS
APPENDIX C
Number of
State Branches
Number of
National Branches
** State laws are silent regarding branch banking.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TESTING THE VALIDITY OF A CONGRES-
SIONAL BILL AUTHORIZING FEDERAL AID TO PRIVATE EDUCATION.
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Federal aid to private educational institutions, both religious and non-
sectarian, is a most provocative and crucial issue currently. It is pro-
vocative because two sizeable factions, one for and one against such aid,
have been increasingly outspoken on this topic and consequently have
stimulated intense interest and comment by the public. It is crucial since
many of the less highly endowed private schools claim that they will be
forced to close in the near future because increasing costs cannot be met
indefinitely by raising tuition rates.
The most heated and intense discussion of the problem involves the
constitutionality of such aid in light of the First Amendment prohibition
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
... "I However, before the United States Supreme Court, the one judicial
body capable of finally settling the issue, can answer the enigma, the pre-
liminary step of determining whether there is a party able to test such a
federal expenditure must be solved. If there is none, so that such a bill
could not be tested in the federal courts, but only in the hypothetical opin-
ions of lawyers and laymen, the support necessary to enact a federal aid
bill might never be obtained from the public and from a majority of the
Congress. The hard core of support on Capitol Hill would come from
Congressmen who are personally sympathetic towards private school aid
and from those who come from districts in which there is a large Catholic
constituency and to whom such a view is virtually a political necessity.
But, as has recently been shown, the hard core falls far short of the needed
majority. Most of our federal legislators are not standard bearers for
such aid, nor are they fully convinced of its legality. Furthermore, a great
many represent an electorate which is divided on the issue. It is unlikely,
therefore, that any member of this dominant group will vote affirmatively
on a private aid proposal unless there are some guarantees that, if passed,
the expenditure can be challenged and the constitutional issue resolved.
President Kennedy's stated belief that federal aid to private education is
unconstitutional only highlights the importance of the testing problem.
Presumably, if such a bill is passed without adequate safeguards along
these lines, it would be vetoed by the Chief Executive. Due to the current
interest in and importance of the testing issue, an examination and an
appraisal of the birth and development of its requirements in the federal
courts will now be undertaken.
1. U. S. CONST. amend. I. This is the famous "non-establishment clause" under
which religious aid battles have raged since 1789.
[VOL. 8
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II.
STANDING TO SUE.
Before a party can come into a federal court and contest the con-
stitutionality of any federal expenditure, he must first contend with and
satisfy the artificial doctrine of "standing to sue" developed by the Supreme
Court. Since this confusing and confused area of constitutional law is the
key to the problem of testing, we shall focus primarily on it.
According to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, "[t] he judicial
power shall extend to all Cases, [and] . . . to Controversies .... "2 In the
view of the Supreme Court, there can be no true "case or controversy"
unless the individual bringing the suit has a personal interest in having
the legislative act which he challenges declared unconstitutional.3 The
constitutional dictate of case or controversy has been refined to require a
direct personal interest by the one suing, i.e., one must show an adverse
effect or intrusion on some federally recognized right. Thus, a showing
that another's rights have been infringed upon, or that there is a possibility
that the party suing will be adversely affected, would be insufficient to
grant standing and such a suit would be summarily dismissed. The court
considers such suits as seeking answers to hypothetical questions; and
hypothetical questions are deemed insufficient to call for the exercise of
the federal judicial power. 4
A.
Historical Aspects.
The background of the effect of standing on federal appropriation acts
begins with the famous case of Frothinghan v. Mellon.5 In that case.
the taxpayer attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Maternity
Act, 6 a federal appropriations bill designed to protect the health of mothers
and infants. The taxpayer alleged that the Maternity Act, by increasing
her future federal taxes, would constitute a taking of her property without
due process of law. The Supreme Court never reached the merits of the
suit but instead dismissed it, holding that there was no jurisdiction since a
2. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
3. In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., the Court supported this view when it said.
"[R]espondents, to have standing in court, must show an injury or threat to a
particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public's interest in the
administration of the law." 310 U.S. 113, 125, 60 S. Ct. 869, 875 (1940).
4. "Our suggestion is only to indicate . . . how careful [courts] should be not
to declare legislative acts unconstitutional upon agreed and general statements ...
This power is the supreme judicial function, and its exercise is only legitimate in
the last resort, in the determination of an earnest and vital controversy." Chicago
and G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 346, 12 S. Ct. 400, 402 (1892).
5. 262 U.S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923).
6. The Maternity Act § 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921). Payments to be made in the
form of grants to the states by the Federal Government amounted to $480,000 the
first year. However, payments were to be withheld from states which did not
comply with the Act.
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true case or controversy did not exist. The taxpayer, in its view, could
show no direct, immediate injury to a personal right.
Said the Court:
A taxpayer's interest in the moneys of the treasury . . . is shared
with millions of others, and is comparatively minute and indeter-
minable, and the effect upon future taxation of any payment out of
the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is
afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of equity ... The
party who invokes the power, must be able to show, not only that
the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally. [Emphasis added].7
The Court's reasoning, from a logical point of view, seems quite
unsound. Earlier in the opinion,8 it recognized that taxpayers of munici-
palities and states are granted standing because their past and future tax
contributions give them the right or interest to judicially insure that tax
funds are spent on activities not alien to their constitution.9 After con-
doning standing on that basis, the Court analyzed the position of the tax-
payer at the federal level and concluded that his interest is too minute and
indeterminable. Thus, the Court held that there is a difference in kind,
and not just in degree, between a municipal or state taxpayer and a federal
taxpayer; one deserves standing, and the other does not. Is this valid
logically or even practically? The only real difference between the two
levels of taxpayers is one of degree, that is, the amount of taxes they pay
in relation to the total amount collected. So, in Frothingham, it was not
that a federal taxpayer had no interest in the way his tax contribution was
spent, but rather, that the ratio of his tax contribution to all the taxes
collected was not sufficient to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power.
Today, though the case is still binding, the rationale is outdated. Under
the federal tax rate schedule for 1962, individual taxpayers in the top tax
bracket, over $300,000, may pay a tax as high as 87% of their taxable
income. Perhaps the Frothingham Court was correct in calling a taxpayer's
interest minute in 1922, but in 1962 such a position is factually unrealistic.
At the state and local level, taxpayers with a tax paid-tax collected ratio
many times smaller than that of the large corporations at the federal level
are given standing without any difficulty,10 on the same or an analogous
basis as that argued by the taxpayer in Frothingham.
It must be remembered that behind every decision lies some social
policy. Even those cases decided strictly on precedent are following the
policy behind the precedential, case. The common sense policy behind
7. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S. Ct. 597, 601 (1923).
8. 262 U.S. at 486, 43 S. Ct. at 601.
9. Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945) (where the complainant
sued as "a resident and taxpayer" and standing was granted) ; Dickman v. Oregon
City, 366 P.2d 533 (Ore. 1961).
10. The city of Valparaiso, along with a committee of citizens, was given standing
to oppose the purchase of stock and assets of one telephone company from another
in In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65 (1930).
226 [VOL. 8
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Frothingham was primarily that of preventing every public appropriation
bill from being dragged through the judicial system by an irate taxpayer.
Perhaps this was not the sole persuading factor, but certainly it was an
important one; so important that the Court blandly hints at the significance
of it in buttressing its decision.
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then
every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the
statute here under review, but also in respect of every other appropri-
ation act and statute whose administration requires the outlay of
public money, and whose validity may be questioned. The bare sug-
gestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes far
to sustain the conclusion we have reached, that a suit of this character
cannot be maintained."
By this decision the Supreme Court has effectively halted judicial
review of all federal appropriations bills by taxpayers. Is this a desirable
result? In the areas of national defense and foreign affairs, perhaps it is.
In view of the action-reaction type of cold war in which the United States
is involved, with the need for rapidity of decision and movement, there is
a consequent need for freedom, discretion, and flexibility in the executive
and legislative branches in these areas. If taxpayers were given standing
to question the constitutionality of federal appropriations bills dealing with
the defense or foreign aid programs, the effectiveness of these vital pro-
grams, which depend on timeliness, would be hindered or destroyed.
In the area of domestic expenditures, however, and especially in the
field of federal aid to private education, the same urgency does not exist,
while the need for review does. First, the taxpayer's interest on the federal
level is not really different in kind from that of state or municipal taxpayers
and so his interest should be sufficient for judicial cognizance. The effect
of the alleged unconstitutional expenditure on the federal taxpayer's taxes
is in reality an injury to a personal right, namely, his right not to have
his money spent unconstitutionally, nor to have his property taken away
without due process of law. Thus, a "case or controversy" does exist.
Secondly, review under this theory is allowed on the state level without
any attendant hindering of effectiveness occurring. 12 Rather, the taxpayer's
suit has acted as a watchdog only against those acts which come close to
the line of unconstitutionality. The same reason for allowing these suits
exists at both the state and federal levels, that is, to prevent the uncon-
stitutional spending of taxpayer's funds. Thirdly, the Supreme Court is
viewed as the protector of the Constitution in the eyes of the American
public. However, the Court still claims that it decides a question of con-
stitutionality only incidentally, when, in an effort to enforce a person's
rights, it becomes imperative to do so. This argument does not seem com-
patible with the test case apparatus by which facts are intentionally and
11. Supra note 6, 262 U.S. at 487, 43 S. Ct. at 601.
12. Supra note 9.
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somewhat artificially aligned so that a constitutional issue is squarely pre-
sented. Those responsible for such test cases want the Supreme Court to
make the final determination because they realize that its decision will be
respected by the entire citizenry as the proper interpretation of the Con-
stitution. Since the Supreme Court has become the recognized authority on
constitutional issues, it follows that the Court should also pass on the
constitutionality of domestic expenditures when flexibility by the Executive
is not of prime importance but a constitutional determination is.
Hence a convincing policy argument can be made to sustain the Froth-
ingham result in two exclusively federal areas, defense and foreign affairs;
in other areas, however, Frothingham is preventing judicial review by
taxpayers of federal appropriations bills where the more convincing argu-
ments seem to favor granting review.
The major difficulty with the above view is that the taxpayer's funds
are used to support both areas. If a case or controversy, and consequently
standing to sue, exists in the one area because of the effect on the individual
taxpayer, it should also exist in the other. The policy of freedom of move-
ment for the executive and legislative branches in the defense and foreign
affairs areas, however, may be of greater importance than strict adherence
to logic. Perhaps a new approach can be devised so that Frothingham can
remain in force in these areas and yet revised so that standing can be
found to test domestic expenditures in other areas affected with a public
interest.
B.
The Court's Inconsistent Approach To Standing.
Before entering the perplexing area of satisfying the standing re-
quirements, it might be well to point out several cases in which the standing
requirement was overlooked by the Supreme Court and the merits of the
cause determined without any apparent investigation of the standing prob-
lem. The following does not purport to be an exhaustive list of such cases,
but is included merely to illustrate the inconsistency with which the Court
has at times approached the standing doctrine.
First, because it shows the position of standing in taxpayers' suits
prior to Frothingham, is an 1899 case, Bradfield v. Roberts.13 A party
suing as "a citizen and taxpayer of the United States and a resident of
the District of Columbia"' 4 sought to enjoin the Treasurer of the United
States from an alleged unconstitutional disbursement of funds to a reli-
13. 175 U.S. 291, 20 S. Ct. 121 (1899).
14. 175 U.S. at 295, 20 S. Ct. at 122. The Court states that the character in
which the complainant sues is as quoted; so it is not just that one of the parties
has alleged that the suit is being brought in this character.
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giously affiliated hospital. 15 The Treasurer claimed that the taxpayer had
no right to maintain the suit because he was suing as a mere taxpayer.
The Court ignored this objection, went directly to the merits, and held
that the appropriation of money for the hospital was not in violation of
that section of the Constitution which says "Congress shall pass no law
respecting an establishment of religion." 16
In Barrows v. Jackson,i v the Supreme Court in effect defended the
rights of a person not a party to the action nor before the Court in any
way. Barrows sued Jackson for damages for breach of a racially restrictive
covenant. The Court in denying relief held that an award by the state court
under the covenant would constitute state action and violate the equal
protection clause as to non-Caucasians against whom the covenant was
directed. However, the defendant was the one who had breached the
covenant and not the one against whom it was directed. Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson correctly pointed out that the Court should never decide a con-
stitutional issue unless the party before it has standing to raise it ;18 here,
the defense inserted by the Court is purely personal to a non-Caucasian,
and the covenant is, in itself, valid as decided in Shelley v. Kraerner.'9
This is an instance where the Court resolved a problem which it felt needed
solving, even though the proper party to raise the constitutional issue was
not before the Court.
The two cases of Everson v. Board of Education 20 and Dorernus v.
Board of Education21 will be considered together since both arose in New
Jersey and both serve to illustrate the capricious handling of standing by
the Supreme Court. Everson, in his capacity as a taxpayer, brought suit
in a New Jersey state court challenging the state statute which provided
for reimbursement of money paid by parents for transportation of their
children to school. No question as to Everson's standing to challenge the
statute under both the state and federal constitutions was ever raised or
discussed. The Court, probably believing that the time was ripe to resolve
a thorny issue, overlooked the standing requirement and simply proceeded
to the merits of the suit, dismissing Everson's allegations that the reim-
bursement statute was unconstitutional. Five years later in Doremus, how-
ever, the Court refused to decide the merits of a similar case on the ground
that the taxpayer had failed to show that the alleged unconstitutional ac-
tivity complained of increased his tax burden, and that therefore the stand-
ing requirements had not been met. Although these cases originally arose
15. The taxpayer alleged that this was "an appropriation by Congress of money
to a religious society." Supra note 14.
16. See U. S. CONST. amend. I.
17. 346 U.S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031 (1953).
18. 346 U.S. at 264, 73 S. Ct. at 1039.
19. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1949). In this case, the Supreme Court held that
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in state courts is state action and
therefore unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses. However, the covenants themselves were not considered invalid.
20. 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
21. 342 U.S. 429, 72 S. Ct. 394 (1952).
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in a state court, they serve to illustrate the inconsistency of the Court's
approach to standing, especially in the controversial first amendment areas.
Reconciling these two cases requires mental gymnastics, the practice of
which some commentators have refused to exercise.2 2 The Court in Doremus
did not overrule or even advert to an earlier case which would have settled
the standing issue. In Heim v. McCall2 3 the Supreme Court, before de-
ciding the merits, adopted the state's view of standing, since the case first
arose in a New York state court and according to New York law a tax-
payer had standing to sue. According to New Jersey law at the time of
Doremius, a taxpayer also had standing; this, although mentioned in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, was overlooked by the majority.
Later, in the same year that Doremus was decided, the Court, again with
some degree of inconsistency, reverted to the doctrine of the Heim case in
Wieman v. Updegraf f, '24 by deciding the merits of a constitutional issue
raised by -n Oklahoma taxpayer who would have had standing under
Oklahoma law but could show no injury to a federally protected right.
The very fact that the Supreme Court has seen fit to ignore the re-
quirement of standing so as to reach the merits of cases presenting con-
stitutional questions of some import, would seem to indicate, at least to
this writer, that the supposed requirement is in need of revision.
III.
ALTERNATE METHODS OF ATTAINING STANDING.
While the foregoing discussion has suggested that the current standing
requirements are inadequate and unsound, and that a revision of them
might be in order, the remainder of this comment will consider the problem
of testing a federal aid to private education bill under the assumption that
no such revision is possible. Thus, the question now is, can such a bill
be tested under the existing doctrine of standing, that is, tinder the
doctrine defined in Frothingham?
Three alternatives will be proposed. The first two have been suggested
in the past and will be outlined but briefly. In this writer's view, their
validity is dubious. The third, however, seems to have merit and perhaps
may provide an affirmative answer to the question before us. It will
therefore be discussed in more detail.
A.
The Statutory Provision.
A solution to the entire standing issue often suggested is that of having
Congress merely confer jurisdiction upon certain federal courts to entertain
22. Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L. Rzv. 353
(1955) ; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REv.
1265 (1961).
23. 239 U.S. 175, 36 S. Ct. 78 (1915).
24. 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215 (1952).
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suits by certain individuals on the constitutionality of a particular appropri-
ations bill. This no doubt would solve the problem since Congress could
be selective as to which bills it inserted such a provision into, and thus
could preserve legislative and executive freedom in the defense and foreign
affairs areas. However, that simple solution was so forcefully advocated
in the 1906 Congress that a special statute was enacted, 25 only to be
declared unconstitutional shortly thereafter by the Supreme Court in
Muskrat v. United States.26 This is a landmark case, still binding today,
which prevents Congress from constitutionally authorizing a person, in
the absence of a true judicially cognizable controversy, to sue to determine
the constitutionality of a statute. The Court considered such a statute an
attempt by Congress to secure an advisory opinion on the constitutionality
of a statute which Congress wished to enact.2 7  In Muskrat the Court
emphatically asserted that the limitation of its jurisdiction to a case or
controversy must be met by facts which in themselves intrinsically constitute
a case or controversy. The Court said:
[T]his attempt to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of the
act of Congress is not presented in a 'case' or 'controversy,' to which
under the Constitution of the United States, the judicial power alone
extends. . . . Confining the jurisdiction of this court within the
limitations conferred by the Constitution . . . we think Congress, in
the [statute involved], exceeded the limitations of legislative authority,
so far as it required of this court, action not judicial in its nature
within the meaning of the Constitution.2 8
These statements would seem to resolve the issue and at present completely
preclude an attempt to attain standing by simply statutorily bestowing
standing on an individual.2 9
B.
Direct Judicial Review.
A commentator for a prominent newspaper gleaned another possible
approach to the standing problem from an Administration brief A0  Ac-
cording to the newspaper article, Congress would appropriate federal funds
to aid private schools on the condition that no aid contribute to "an estab-
lishment of religion. '31 Presumably, the aid to private education plan
25. § 1876, 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
26. 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250 (1911).
27. The Court said: "It is therefore evident that there is neither more nor
less in this procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial determination, final
in this Court, of the constitutional validity of an act of Congress." Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 352, 31 S. Ct. 250, 255 (1911). [Emphasis added].
28. 219 U.S. 346, 352, 31 S. Ct. 250, 255 (1911).
29. But see the proposed Bardon Bill which would have authorized certain
amounts to be paid to the states to be used in public elementary and secondary
school education. In the bill was a provision granting standing to a state taxpayer
to come into a federal district court to seek enforcement of the statute. H.R. 4643,
81st. Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
30. See the article by Anthony Lewis, The New York Times, March 29, 1961.
31. U. S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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would be carried out by an administrative official. The next step would
be to wait until the government official denied a private school's application
for such aid on the ground that in that particular case it was aiding the
"establishment of religion." This, according to the brief, would give the
school standing to sue on the basis of economic injury through the loss of
the federal aid. However, the school deriving standing from such a
measure would be limited to arguing that it is entitled to the aid under
the statute because the aid would not contribute to the establishment of
religion in its case. It would seem, therefore, that neither the government
official nor the school would be in a position to question the constitutionality
of a federal bill providing for aid to private education. While the official
could and would defend the nondisbursement of aid in the particular case,
he could not sensibly argue the unconstitutionality of a statute which was
enacted by a branch of the government which he represents.
C.
Delegation To An Administrative Agency.
In the field of administrative law lies the method of achieving standing
most likely to be judicially recognized, since it has some precedent in case
law. It must first be pointed out that there is a distinction to be made
between provisions for review of administrative action or regulation and
congressional statutes. Administrative agencies are extensions of the legis-
lative branch to which authority is delegated. It is therefore easier to
recognize congressional provisions for review of agency action, due to
the need for judicial supervision of these agencies, than it is to recognize
provisions for review of Congress' own action. To avoid any such compli-
cation in the present treatment of the standing problem, the assumption
will be made that an administrative agency would be used by Congress to
effectuate any program for federal aid to private education.
The Administrative Procedure Act at section 10 provides that,
"[e]xcept so far as (1) statutes preclude review or (2) agency action is
by law committed to agency discretion ... any person suffering legal wrong
because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such
action within the meaning of any relevant statute shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof." [Emphasis added]-32 This act applies to virtually all
administrative agencies and provides the right to challenge an agency action
to those "adversely affected or aggrieved." These terms are words of art
in the administrative law field and include within their meaning one who i.
in fact hurt by agency action. This rather nebulous idea embraces a much
wider group of activities than does standing to sue, which requires an in-
jury to a recognized right. For example, in Associated Industries of New
York v. Ickes,13 Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
32. The Administrative Procedure Act, § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946).
33. 134 F.2d 694 (1943).
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was of the opinion that a consumer of coal is a person aggrieved under
section 6(b) of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,' 4 when the consumer
is affected by the change in the price of coal as promulgated by the
Bituminous Coal Division.3 5 Thus, a consumer, a term of much wider
scope than that of taxpayer, was given the right to review agency deter-
minations. In the Associated Industries case, Judge Frank reviewed two
cases which more than any others in the administrative law field indicate
the Supreme Court's view of the standing doctrine. The two cases are
Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,3 6
and Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.3 1
In Sanders, a newspaper seeking to enter into radio broadcasting filed
an application for a permit to establish a station in Dubuque, Iowa.
Sanders, who had operated a station in East Dubuque for some time and
had already submitted an application for a permit to move that station to
Dubuque, intervened in the proceeding. Both applications were then con-
solidated into one proceeding and the FCC granted both permits. Sanders
petitioned the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia for review.' 8
That court held that the FCC had not considered the possibility of economic
injury to Sanders through increased competition and that therefore the
order granting the permit to the newspaper was invalid. In its opinion it
touched only slightly on the question of Sanders' standing to appeal. The
court seemed content with interpreting the facts of the case and apparently
accepted the view that the "person aggrieved" administrative statutes3 9 are
constitutional and are not controlled by the case or controversy clause.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court delved more deeply into the standing
problem before granting Sanders the right to review. However, the Court
did rule against Sanders on the economic injury issue, holding that, in
and of itself, such a finding should not control the agency's decision, nor
need there always be a finding made on this issue. The newspaper there-
upon contended that since the economic injury issue need not be before
the agency, a showing of economic injury by Sanders would not give him
standing to appeal as a "person aggrieved" under section 402(b) (2) of the
Act. 40 Then, in a sweeping manner, the Court rejected that argument and
justified the grant of standing to appeal to a person aggrieved within the
Act.
[Congress] may have been of the opinion that one likely to be
financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person
34. 50 Stat. 85 (1937).
35. This is the administrative agency to which the duty of carrying out the
provisions of the Act was delegated. The Bituminous Coal Division was a sub-
department of the Department of Interior.
36. 309 U.S. 470, 60 S. Ct. 693 (1940).
37. 316 U.S. 4, 62 S. Ct. 875 (1942).
38. See Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. Federal Communications Commission,
106 F.2d 321 (1939).
39. In this instance it is the Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b) (2), 48 Stat.
1064 (1934).
40. Id.
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having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate
court errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the
license. It is within the power of Congress to confer such standing to
prosecute an appeal. We hold, therefore, that the respondent had the
requisite standing to appeal and to raise, in the court below, any
relevant question of law in respect of the order of the Commission.
[Emphasis added].41
Thus was put to rest any doubt that these administrative statutes
granting review to "persons aggrieved" might violate traditional notions of
the case or controversy doctrine. The last sentence of the above quotation
would also seem to solve another thorny issue, that is, the problem of
limitation of issues which can be raised. It seems clear that in appeals from
administrative action, constitutional prohibitions, as well as other issues,
may be raised once the litigant gains standing.
Scripps-Howard, the other landmark case in this area, further refines
the Supreme Court's concept of standing. The FCC granted an application
for a license to a Columbus, Ohio radio station, WCOL, without a hearing.
WCOL wanted to change the frequency of its broadcasts from 1210 to
1200 kilocycles and to increase its power from 100 to 250 watts. Scripps-
Howard operated a radio station in Cincinnati, Ohio on a frequency of
1200 kilocycles with 250 watt power. After a petition by Scripps-Howard
requesting a vacating of the previous order and a scheduling of a hearing
for the WCOL application was denied by the FCC, Scripps-Howard peti-
tioned the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to stay the FCC
order pending the outcome of the appeal. The Court of Appeals, after
splitting evenly on the question of whether it had the power to grant the
stay, certified the question to the Supreme Court. In finding in the
affirmative, that Court reaffirmed its holding in Sanders by saying: "The
purpose of the Communications Act was to protect the public interest in
communications. By § 402(b) (2), Congress gave the right of appeal to
persons aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by Commission
action .... But these private litigants have standing only as representatives
of the public interest." [Emphasis added].42 With that language a totally
new concept in the development of the federal standing doctrine was intro-
duced. The dissent, by Mr. Justice Douglas, in criticizing the majority for
holding that the petitioner represented the public interest by insuring that
administrative officials do not exceed the bounds of their authority, said:
"[u]nless petitioner can show that his individual interest has been unlaw-
fully invaded, there is merely damnum absque injuria and no cause of
action on the merits." [Emphasis added]..
The Associated Industries case is the most recent federal court decision
to add to the power of Congress relative to standing requirements. Asso-
41. Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 477, 60 S. Ct. 693, 698 (1940).
42. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S.
4, 14, 62 S. Ct. 875, 882 (1942).
43. 316 U.S. at 21, 62 S. Ct. at 885.
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ciated Industries, Inc. was composed of industrial and commercial firms,
most of which were substantial consumers of coal. After the Bituminous
Coal Division, pursuant to the Bituminous Coal Act, had entered an order
establishing minimum prices per ton of coal in the New York area, Asso-
ciated Industries filed a petition seeking review of that order before the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, contending that the Coal Division
had acted beyond the scope of its authority under the Act and that the orders
were based upon findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence.
Ickes, the respondent, was Secretary of the Interior, under whose super-
vision the Act was to be administered. He argued that consumers of coal
were not the proper parties to seek review of a Coal Division order, and that
they cannot come into court to complain of the economic burden placed upon
them by increased prices since Congress intended the interests of the con-
sumers to be safeguarded by the Bituminous Coal Consumers' Counsel, as
indicated in the Act.44 Section 6(b) of the Act granted the right of
review to any "person aggrieved. ' 45 Respondent contended that these
words applied only to those persons who, in the absence of section 6(b),
would have had standing to sue in the district courts for an injunction to
halt the enforcement of the Coal Division's order. Under such an inter-
pretation Associated Industries would have had to show that the order
invaded or would invade a private substantive legally protected interest.
After referring to the inroads that Sanders and Scripps-Howard made
on traditional notions of standing, Judge Frank proceeded to outline the
present status of the standing doctrine in the federal courts.
While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one in the
absence of an actual justiciable controversy, to bring a suit for the
judicial determination either of the constitutionality of a statute or
the scope of powers conferred by a statute upon government officers,
it can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials, such as the
Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another official
from acting in violation of his statutory powers; for then an actual
controversy exists, and the Attorney General can properly be vested
with authority in such a controversy to vindicate the interest of the
public or the government. Instead of designating the Attorney General,
or some other public officer to bring such a proceeding, Congress can
constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person,
or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring a
suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory powers;
for then, in like manner, there is an actual controversy, and there is
nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any
person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a con-
troversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.
44. The Counsel, according to section (2) (b) of the Bituminous Coal Act, 50
Stat. 85 (1937), was to be appointed to represent the public interest, and he did not
petition the Court for review of the Coal Division's order.
45. Bituminous Coal Act, § 6(b), 50 Stat. 85 (1937).
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Such persons, so authorized, are so to speak, private Attorney
Generals. [Emphasis added]. 46
The Court then decided that a consumer is a person aggrieved, and
therefore Associated Industries did have standing as a representative of
the public interest because Congress had so authorized.
It appears, therefore, that one who can show some economic detriment
can qualify as a person aggrieved. Although this is probably not the only
method of meeting the standard, it is broad enough to qualify a sufficient
number of individuals so that agency actions can be reviewed in a manner
which will serve the public interest. Thus, the Sanders, Scripps-Howard,
and Associate Industries cases would appear to have sufficiently developed
the standing doctrine so that a federal aid to private education bill could
be tested.
To effectuate the purpose, Congress must delegate to a new or an exist-
ing agency the duty of administering aid to private school applicants and
must place a "person aggrieved" provision in the statute. The agency
decision could then be challenged by one able to show economic detriment.
Such a person might be an individual or another private school in the same
area as the applicant. An individual could argue that since he sends his
child to X school which does not receive the same amount of aid as Y
school, he is being economically injured by having to pay the difference in
higher tuition. A school itself, of course, would have the better argument,
since it would be more directly affected by aid given in differing amounts
to other schools in the area. By virtue of the Sanders decision, once the
right to review has been established any relevant challenges as to validity,
including unconstitutionality, may be raised.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
Three alternatives to attain standing have been presented, the statutory
provision, direct judicial review, and delegation to an administrative agency.
The first two suggestions are an attempt to cover the field and provide
food for thought in the very complicated area of standing. It is conceded
that their chance of success in attaining review, as a practical matter, is
very slight. However, the last proposal discussed is urged as the one with
the most likelihood of success. It is clear that drafting and enacting such
a statute would raise enumerable problems, but once enacted, it is sub-
mitted that standing could be attained, and at long last the constitutionality
of federal aid to private education could be tested before the Supreme Court.
Michael R. Bradley
46. Associated Industries of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
Certiorari to the Supreme Court was granted, 319 U.S. 739, 63 S. Ct. 1436 (1943), but
the case was finally dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707, 64 S. Ct. 74 (1943).
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